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Introduction

Introduction and Motivation
The emergence of Internet as a sales channel has made it very easy for companies to experiment with selling prices. Where in the past costs and effort were needed to change prices, for example by issuing a new catalogue or replacing price tags, and consequently prices where fixed for longer periods of 2 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2011-11-587 time, nowadays a webshop can adapt their prices with a proverbial flick of the switch, without any additional costs or efforts. This flexibility in pricing is one of the main drivers for research on dynamic pricing: the study of determining optimal selling prices under changing circumstances.
A much-studied situation is a firm who sells limited amounts of products during finite selling periods, after which all unsold products perish. Examples of products with this property are flight tickets, hotel rooms, car rental reservations, and concert tickets. Various dynamic pricing models are already applied in these branches (see Talluri and van Ryzin 2004) . Other products that fall in this framework but for which dynamic pricing is not (yet) commonplace, are newspapers, magazines, and food at a grocery store. The emergence of digital price tags however may change this in the near future, see Kalyanam et al. (2006) . An important insight from the literature on dynamic pricing is that the optimal selling price of these type of products depends on the remaining inventory and the length of the remaining selling period, see e.g. Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) . The optimal decision is thus not to use a single price but a collection of prices: one for each combination of remaining inventory and remaining length of the selling period. To determine these optimal prices it is essential to know the relation between the demand and the selling price. In most literature from the nineties on dynamic pricing, it is assumed that this relation is exactly known to the seller, but in practice exact information on consumer behavior is generally not available. It is therefore not surprising that the review on dynamic pricing by Bitran and Caldentey (2003) mentions dynamic pricing with demand learning as an important future research direction. The presence of digital sales data enables a data-driven approach of dynamic pricing, where the selling firm not only determines optimal prices, but also learns how changing prices affects the demand. Ideally, this learning will eventually lead to optimal pricing decisions.
In this study we consider a pricing-and-learning problem motivated from the hotel industry (Talluri and van Ryzin 2004, section 10.2, Weatherford and Kimes 2003) . In that context, a 'product' corresponds to a combination of arrival-date and length-of-stay (possibly augmented by other features or requirements.) These products are perishable (unsold opportunities cannot be held in stock), are sold during a finite time period, and the available capacity is finite. An important feature of this context is that a firm typically sells many different products with similar demand characteristics at the same time. This means that learning the demand characteristics of each product separately may not be very efficient; instead, the firm would want to take learn about consumer behavior from all the sales data corresponding to products with similar demand characteristics.
This motivates the current study this problem of dynamic pricing and learning of perishable products with finite initial inventory, during multiple consecutive selling seasons of finite and fixed duration.
bound.
Thus, the regret, which can be interpreted as the 'cost for learning', behaves structurally different in these two models. This difference in qualitative behavior can be explained as follows.
In the infinite inventory model, prices and parameter estimates can get stuck in what Harrison et al. (2012) call an 'indeterminate equilibrium'. This means that for some values of the parameter estimates, the expected observed demand at the certainty equivalent price is equal to what the parameter estimates predict; in other words, the observations confirm the correctness of the (incorrect) parameter estimates. As a result, certainty equivalent control induces insufficient dispersion in the chosen selling prices to eventually learn the true value of the parameters.
Such cannot occur in the setting with finite inventories and finite selling seasons. An optimal price -optimal w.r.t. certain parameter estimates -is namely not a fixed number, but changes depending on the remaining inventory and the remaining length of the selling season. Thus, an optimal policy naturally induces endogenous price dispersion, and prices cannot get stuck in an 'indeterminate equilibrium'. On the contrary, the large amount of price dispersion implies that the unknown parameters are learned quite fast, and consequently that the Regret(T ) is only O(log 2 (T )).
The main conceptual takeaway of our paper is that, in decision problems under uncertainty, a passive-learning strategy works well if it induces sufficient dispersion in the controls. We show this for a specific dynamic-pricing problem, but, as we argue in Section 5.2, the idea is also applicable in other decision problems.
Our work complements two streams of literature on dynamic-pricing-and-learning. First, in the infinite-capacity setting (Kleinberg and Leighton 2003 , Broder and Rusmevichientong 2012 , Harrison et al. 2011 , den Boer and Zwart 2010 it is known that active price experimentation is necessary to achieve optimal regret; myopic policies have suboptimal performance. In our finite-capacity setting, changes in the marginal-value-of-inventory causes endogenous price dispersion, which makes sure that learning the unknown parameters "takes care of itself", and which leads to a qualitatively much better performance than what is possible in the infinite-capacity setting. Second, in the finite-capacity setting where demand and inventory level grow to infinity Zeevi 2009, Wang et al. 2011) , active price experimentation is also known to be necessary to achieve optimal performance. The reason is that, in this asymptotic regime, the amount of price dispersion induced by the myopic policy decreases to zero. This asymptotic regime may have practical value if demand, initial inventory, and the length of the selling season are relatively large. In the problem that inspired the current study, pricing in the hotel industry, this is not the case: the average demand, initial capacity and length of a selling period are typically quite small, which makes this den Boer and Zwart: Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Finite Inventories Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2011-11-587 5 particular asymptotic regime not a suitable setting to study the performance of pricing strategies.
We therefore consider a different asymptotic regime in which changes in the marginal-value-ofinventory keeps inducing price dispersion in the asymptotic regime; as a result, no active price experimentation is necessary, and the myopic strategy performs very well.
Our work is also connected to the field of adaptive control in Markov decision problems (Hernández-Lerma 1989 , Kumar 1985 , chapter 12 of Kumar and Varaiya 1986 ). An important feature that distinguishes our work from many previous literature in this area, is the following.
Hernández-Lerma and Cavazos-Cadena (1990), Gordienko and Minjárez-Sosa (1998) assume that the "next" state x t+1 at period t + 1 is determined by the "current" state x t , action a t , and a random component ξ t . These random components are assumed to be independent and identically distributed. In our setting, the randomness in state transitions is completely determined by the demand realizations. These are neither identically distributed (their distribution depends on the chosen prices), nor independent (chosen prices may depend on all previously chosen prices and observed demand realizations, and, consequentially, demand in different time periods is not independent). In other literature, such as Altman and Shwartz (1991) , unknown transition probabilities are estimated by the empirically observed relative frequencies. In our setting, all uncertainty is captured by an unknown parameter, and transition probabilities are estimated simultaneously.
Furthermore, we consider a compact continuous action space, in contrast to e.g. Burnetas and Katehakis (1997) , Chang et al. (2005) who assume a finite action space, which links the adaptive control problem to the multi-armed bandit problem.
Summarizing, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
(i) We formulate the problem of dynamic pricing with finite inventories during multiple, consecutive selling seasons of finite duration, with parametric uncertainty in the demand function.
(ii) We propose a simple and intuitive pricing strategy, based on the idea of subsequently estimating the unknown parameters and choosing the selling price that would be optimal if this parameter estimate were correct.
(iii) We show that the problem satisfies an endogenous-learning property, which means that the use of policies that are optimal w.r.t. parameter estimates automatically induces a certain amount of price dispersion.
(iv) We prove that this leads to convergence of the parameter estimates to the true value, and we show Regret(T ) = O(log 2 (T )).
(v) We provide an instance for which any pricing strategy has Regret(T ) that grows at least logarithmically in T , implying that the O(log 2 (T )) upper bound on the regret is close to the best achievable growth rate.
(vi) We provide numerical examples to illustrate our results, and discuss various extensions of our model. Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2011-11-587 
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the mathematical model, the structure of the demand distribution, the full-information optimal solution, the regret measure, the method to estimate unknown parameters, and convergence rates for this estimator. The endogenous-learning property of the system is described in Section 3.1. Our pricing strategy is introduced in Section 3.2, the upper bound Regret(T ) = O(log 2 (T )) is shown in Section 3.3, and the log(T ) lower bound in Section 3.4. Numerical illustrations of the pricing strategy and its performance are provided in Section 4. A discussion of the results and possible extensions of this paper is provided in Section 5. The e-companion to this paper contains the mathematical proofs of the theorems in this paper, as well as a number of auxiliary lemmas used in the proofs.
Notation The interior of a set U ⊂ R n is denoted by int(U ). If v is a vector then ||v|| denotes the Euclidean norm, and v T the transpose. If A is an m × n matrix, ||A|| = max x∈R n ,||x||=1 ||Ax|| denotes the induced matrix norm of A, and λ min (A) denotes the smallest eigenvalue of A. For x ∈ R, ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer which is smaller than or equal to x.
Model Primitives
In this section we subsequently introduce the model, describe the characteristics of the demand distribution, discuss the optimal pricing policy under full information, introduce the regret as quality measure of pricing policies, and discuss convergence rates for the maximum likelihood estimator.
Model Formulation
We consider a monopolist seller of perishable products which are sold during consecutive selling seasons. Each selling season consists of S ∈ N discrete time periods: the i-th selling season starts at time period 1 + (i − 1)S, and lasts until period iS, for all i ∈ N. We write SS t = 1 + ⌊(t − 1)/S⌋ to denote the selling season corresponding to period t, and s t = t − (SS t − 1)S to denote the relative time in the selling period. At the start of each selling season the seller has C ∈ N discrete units of inventory at his disposal, which can only be sold during that particular selling season. At the end of a selling season, all unsold inventory perishes.
In each time period t ∈ N the seller has to determine a selling price p t ∈ [p l , p h ]. Here 0 < p l < p h denote the lowest and highest price admissible to the firm. After setting the price the seller observes a realization of demand, which takes values in {0, 1}, and collects revenue. We let c t , (t ∈ N), denote the capacity or inventory level at the beginning of period t ∈ N, and d t the demand in period t.
The dynamics of (c t ) t∈N are given by
The pricing decisions of the seller are allowed to depend on previous prices and demand realizations, but not on future ones. More precisely, for each t ∈ N we define the set of possible histories
that p 1 = ψ 1 (∅), and for each t ≥ 2 the seller chooses the price p t = ψ t (p 1 , . . . , p t−1 , d 1 , . . . , d t−1 ).
The revenue collected in period t equals p t min{c t , d t }. The purpose of the seller is to find a pricing strategy ψ that maximizes the cumulative expected revenue earned after T selling seasons,
Here we write E ψ to emphasize that this expectation depends on the pricing strategy ψ.
Demand Distribution
The demand in a single time period against selling price p is a realization of the random variable
, some (β 0 , β 1 ) ∈ R 2 , and some function h. The true value of β is denoted by β (0) , and is unknown to the seller. Conditionally on selling prices, the demand in any two different time periods are independent.
To ensure existence and uniqueness of revenue-maximizing selling prices, we make a number of assumptions on h and β. First, we assume that β (0) lies in the interior of a compact set B ⊂ R 2 known to the seller, and assume that β 1 < 0 for all β ∈ B. Second, we assume that h is three times continuously differentiable, log-concave, h(β 0 + β 1 p) ∈ (0, 1) for all β ∈ B and p ∈ [p l , p h ], and the derivativeḣ(z) of h(z) is strictly positive. This last assumption, together with β 1 < 0 for all β ∈ B, implies that expected demand is decreasing in p, for all β ∈ B.
We assume that g a,β (0) (p l ) < 1, g a,β (0) (p h ) > 1, and g a,β (0) (p) is strictly increasing in p, for all 0 ≤ a ≤ r * . These conditions, which for a = 0 coincide with the assumptions in Lariviere (2006, page 602), ensure that the function which maps p to (p − a)h(β 
Full-information Optimal Solution
If the value of β is known, the optimal prices can be determined by solving a Markov decision problem (MDP). Since each selling season corresponds to the same MDP, the optimal pricing strategy for multiple selling seasons is to repeatedly use the optimal policy for a single selling A (stationary deterministic) policy π is a matrix (π(c, s)) 0≤c≤C,1≤s≤S in the policy space Π = [p l , p h ] (C+1)×S . Given a policy π ∈ Π, let V π β (c, s) be the expected revenue-to-go function starting in state (c, s) ∈ X and using the actions of π. Then V π β (c, s) satisfies the following recursion:
V π β (0, s) = 0,
for all 1 ≤ s ≤ S, where we write V π β (c, S + 1) = 0 for all 0 ≤ c ≤ C. By Proposition 4.4.3 of Puterman (1994), for each β ∈ B there is a corresponding optimal policy π * β ∈ Π. This policy can be calculated using backward induction. Write V β (c, s) = V π * β β (c, s) for the optimal revenue-to-go function. Then V β (c, s) and π * β (c, s), for 1 ≤ c ≤ C, 1 ≤ s ≤ S, satisfy the following recursion:
where we define ∆V β (c, s) = V β (c, s) − V β (c − 1, s), and ∆V β (0, s) = 0 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ S. The price π * β (0, s) can be chosen arbitrarily, since it has no effect on the reward. The optimal average reward of the MDP is equal to V β (C, 1), and the true optimal average reward is equal to V β (0) (C, 1). 
Regret Measure
The quality of the pricing decisions of the seller are measured by the regret: the expected amount of money lost due to not using optimal prices. The regret of pricing strategy ψ after the first T selling seasons is defined as
where (p i ) i∈N denote the prices generated by the pricing strategy ψ.
Maximizing the cumulative expected revenue is equivalent to minimizing the regret, but observe that the regret cannot directly be used by the seller to find the optimal strategy, since it depends on the unknown β (0) . Also note that we calculate the regret over a number of selling seasons, and not over a number of time periods. The reason is that the optimal policy π * β (0) is optimized over an entire selling season, and not over each individual state of the underlying MDP: a price p t may induce a higher instant reward in a certain state (c t , s t ) than the optimal price π * β (0) (c t , s t ). This effect is averaged out by looking at the optimal expected reward in an entire selling season.
For small T the optimal policy under incomplete information can in theory be calculated exactly, by solving a MDP with state-space that includes all possible demand realizations. This MDP however is computationally intractable for even moderate values of T . It is therefore common in the literature on dynamic pricing to study the asymptotic growth rate of Regret(T ) as T grows large, and search for pricing strategies that have the lowest possible growth rate on the regret.
Parameter Estimation
The value of β (0) can be estimated with maximum-likelihood estimation. In particular, given a sample of prices p 1 , . . . , p t and demand realizations d 1 , . . . d t , the log-likelihood function L t (β) equals
The score function, the derivative of L t (β) with respect to β, equals
We letβ t be a solution to l t (β) = 0. If no solution exists, we defineβ t = β (1) , for some predefined
If a solution to l t (β) = 0 exists but lies outside B, we defineβ t as the projection of this solution on B. For most choices of h there is no explicit formula for the solution of l t (β) = 0, and numerical methods have to be deployed to calculate it. 
Convergence Rates of Parameter Estimates
Understanding the asymptotic behavior of the maximum quasi-likelihood estimateβ t , in particular the speed at which it converges to β (0) , is important to study the performance of pricing strategies.
We here quote a result from den Boer and Zwart (2011) about these convergence rates; in Section 3.3, this result is used to prove bounds on the regret of a pricing strategy.
The speed at which the estimates converge to β (0) turns out to be closely related to a certain measure of price dispersion: the more price dispersion, the faster the parameters converge. In particular, if we define the matrix
then λ min (P t ), the smallest eigenvalue of P t , turns out to be a suitable measure for the amount of price dispersion in a sample.
The following proposition shows how λ min (P t ) influences the convergence speed of the parameter estimates. To state the result, we define the last-time random variable
for ρ > 0.
all t ≥ t 0 and some non-random t 0 ∈ N, and such that inf t≥t 0 L(t)t −α > 0, for some α > 1/2. Then
This proposition follows directly from Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and Remark 2 in den Boer and Zwart (2011).
Main Result: a Case of Endogenous Learning
The model described in the previous section satisfies an endogenous-learning property: if the decision maker does not deviate much from the optimal price policy, then the unknown parameters of the system are learned very fast. This is caused by a natural amount of price dispersion that appears when the optimal policy is used. This dispersion causes the estimatesβ t to converge very quickly to the unknown parameters β (0) , and as a result, the decision maker can use a simple myopic pricing policy to achieve a very good performance. This is the main takeaway of this paper.
The endogenous-learning property is formally stated in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 we formulate a pricing strategy, which (apart from a small correction) is equal to a myopic strategy. The den Boer and Zwart: Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Finite Inventories Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2011-11-587 11 endogenous-learning property causes the regret of this pricing strategy to grow as Regret(T ) = O(log 2 (T )); this is shown in Section 3.3. This upper bound is complemented by a lower bound in Section 3.4, where we show an instance for which no pricing strategy can achieve sub-logarithmic regret.
Endogenous Learning
Proposition 1 shows how the growth rate of λ min (P t ) influences the speed at which the parameter estimates converge to the true value. The main result of this section is that λ min (P t ) strictly increases if, during a selling season, prices are used that are close to that prescribed by π * β (0) . This means that a continuous use of prices close to π * β (0) leads to a linear growth rate of λ min (P t ), which by Proposition 1 implies that the parameter estimates converges very fast to the true value, in
and
The condition 1 < C < S in Theorem 1 makes sure that price dispersion occurs during a selling season. If C = 1 then the firm may go out-of-stock in the first period of the selling season, which implies that only a single price is charged during that selling season and thus no price dispersion occurs. The C ≥ S case can be interpreted as that C − S items cannot be sold at all, and that each of the remaining S items can only be sold in a single, dedicated time period. As a result, there is no interaction between individual items, and the pricing problem is equivalent to S repetitions of the pricing problem with C = 1, S = 1, which means that no price dispersion occurs. Phrased differently: if C ≥ S then the marginal-value-of-inventory remains constant throughout the selling season, and thus the optimal price is constant as well. Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) , den
Boer and Zwart (2010), Harrison et al. (2012) consider pricing strategies for this case, and show that the lack of endogenous learning means that active price experimentation is necessary to learn the unknown parameters. For 1 < C < S, Section 5.4 discusses in more detail the effect of C and S on the amount of price dispersion.
In Remark EC.1, stated directly after the proof of Theorem 1, we compute an explicit, positive lower bound on v 0 . 
Pricing Strategy
We propose a pricing strategy based on the following principle: in each period, estimate the unknown parameters, and subsequently use the action from the policy that is optimal with respect to this estimate.
Pricing strategy Φ(ϵ)
Pricing:
Given a positive inventory level, the pricing strategy Φ(ϵ) sets the price p t+1 equal to the price that is optimal according to the available parameter estimatesβ t , except possibly when the state
This set contains all states that, with positive probability, are the last states in the selling season in which products are sold (either because the selling season almost finishes, or because the inventory consists of only a single product). In these states, the price p t+1 deviates from the certainty equivalent price p ceqp if otherwise max{|p i − p j | |
This deviation ensures that also for small t, whenβ t may be far away from the true value β (0) , a minimum amount of price dispersion is guaranteed.
Upper Bound on the Regret
The endogenous-learning property described in Section 3.1 implies that ifβ t is sufficiently close to β (0) and ϵ is sufficiently small, then I) does not occur. Asβ t converges to β (0) , the pricing strategy Φ(ϵ) eventually acts as a certainty equivalent pricing strategy. The pricing decisions in II) are driven by optimizing instant revenue, and do not reckon with the objective of optimizing the quality of the parameter estimatesβ t . The endogenous-learning property makes sure that learning the parameter values happens on the fly, without active effort. As a result, the parameter estimates converge quickly to their true values, and the pricing decisions quickly to the optimal pricing decisions. The following theorem shows that the regret of the strategy Φ(ϵ) is O(log 2 (T )) in the number of selling seasons T .
To prove Theorem 2, we construct a Markov decision problem with a state-space that consists of all sequences of possible demand realizations in a selling season. This ensures that, conditional on all prices and demand realizations before a selling season, Φ(ϵ) corresponds to a stationary deterministic policy, where each state of the state-space is associated with a unique price prescribed by Φ(ϵ). We subsequently prove several sensitivity results that enable us to quantify the effect of estimation errors β t − β (0) on the regret. The endogenous-learning property of Theorem 1, combined with the "small t correction" in I) of the description of Φ(ϵ), implies that λ min (P t ) grows linearly in t. Using Proposition 1 this enables us to prove the O(log 2 (T )) bound on the regret.
In Remark EC.1, stated directly after the proof of Theorem 1, we compute an explicit, positive lower bound on v 0 .
Lower Bound on the Regret
In this section we complement the O(log 2 (T )) upper bound of Theorem 2 by a lower bound on the regret. In particular, we show an instance for which any pricing strategy has regret that grows logarithmically in T . This shows that the asymptotic growth rate of regret of Φ(ϵ) is close to the best achievable asymptotic growth rate. 
The theorem is proven by applying a generalization of the van Trees inequality, (Gill and Levit 1995) , along the same lines of (Lemma 4. 6 Broder and Rusmevichientong 2012) . Note that the goal of the theorem is not to provide the best constant before the log(T ) term, but to show the qualitative result that there is no pricing strategy with Regret(T ) = o(log(T )). 
Numerical Illustration
To illustrate the analytical results that we have derived, we provide a number of numerical illustrations. We first offer a simple instance that illustrate strong consistency of the parameter estimates and convergence of the relative regret to zero. We also briefly consider the 'gap' between the upper bound O(log 2 (T )) of Theorem 2 and the lower bound of Theorem 3. We subsequently look at an instance where we vary the level of initial inventory C, and look at the effect on the regret. In the last illustration we fix C but vary S, to look at the effect of the length of the selling season on the regret.
Basic Example
As a first example, we consider an instance with C = 10, S = 20, p l = 1, p h = 20, β
1 = −0.4, and h(z) = logit(z). The optimal expected revenue per selling season, V β (0) (C, 1), is equal to 47.8. We consider a time span of 100 selling periods, and run 100 simulations. 
To show some light on the growth rate of the regret, we scale in Figure 2 the regret by a log(n) and a log 2 (n) factor. Theorem 2 entails that Regret(n)/ log 2 (n) is bounded, which accords with the righthand plot in Figure 2 . However, Theorem 3 suggests that the O(log 2 (n)) bound may be too conservative, and that in fact the regret may grow logarithmically (cf. the discussion in Section 5.3). The lefthand plot of Figure 2 shows the regret scaled by a log-factor. This picture does not strongly support the assertion that Regret(n)/ log(n) is bounded, but this may be caused by finitehorizon effects. Our numerical simulation thus does not give a conclusive answer on the question whether this 'gap' really exists in practice, or merely is a consequence of used proof techniques.
Different choices for β (0) show a similar picture.
Different Levels of Initial Inventory
In our second numerical example we illustrate the effect of initial inventory on the regret. We consider the same instance as in the previous example, but take S = 10 and C ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , 9}, and run 100 simulations for each value of C. Table 1 shows for each C the optimal revenue per selling season, and the simulation average of the regret, the relative regret, and the estimation error at the end of the time horizon.
The fourth column of Table 1 suggests that the relative regret is not monotone in C, but is minimal for some C strictly between 1 and S. This can intuitively be explained as follows. For 
Figure 2
Simulation average of regret, scaled by log(n) and log 2 (n). larger values of C, the fraction of time that the firm is out-of-stock is small; this means that estimates are based on more data, which generally increases the quality of the parameter estimates.
However, if C gets close to S then the amount of price dispersion induced by the myopic policy decreases: for a substantial portion of a selling season there is hardly any variation in the marginal- -2011-11-587 value-of-inventory, and as result the optimal price for different states (c, s) in the state-space of the underlying MDP does not vary much. This behavior is reflected in the average estimation error at the end of the time horizon, shown in the fifth column of Table 1 .
Different Length of Selling Season
In our third numerical illustration we consider the same instance as in the previous two illustrations, but fix the inventory level at C = 5, and vary the length of the selling season. We let S ∈ {6, 7, . . . , 14}, and for each choice of S run 100 simulations. Table 2 shows for each S the optimal revenue per selling season, and the simulation average of the regret, the relative regret, and the estimation error at the end of the time horizon. The results from Table 2 show that the relative regret is decreasing in S. This is not surprising:
larger values of S means that there are not only more opportunities to sell products, but also more opportunities to learn about customer behavior. This is reflected in the fifth column of the table, which shows that the simulation average of the estimation error at the end of the time horizon is decreasing in S.
Discussion
Extensions to Other Demand Models
To facilitate analysis we impose some assumptions on the demand function: it depends on only two unknown parameters (β 0 , β 1 ), and is of the form E[D(p)] = h(β 0 + β 1 p). Conceptually our results do not hinge on these assumptions, and may still hold if one considers a demand model that involves more than two unknown parameters, or where demand depends on the stage in the selling season. (6) is then equal to the (m + 1) × (m + 1) matrix
To prove an endogenous-learning property similar to Theorem 1, one should show that for all β close to β (0) , using the policy π * β in selling season k implies λ min (P kS ) − λ min (P (k−1)S ) > ϵ, for all k ∈ N and some ϵ > 0 independent of k and β. This means that the amount of price dispersion, measured by the smallest eigenvalue of the design matrix, strictly increases in each selling season, and as a result, the maximum likelihood estimate of β converge a.s. to the true value.
For this particular demand model, the endogenous-learning property can be guaranteed if a.s. m + 1 distinct prices p 1 , . . . , p m+1 are used during a selling season, under policy π * β . (Compare this to the proof of Theorem 1, where we show that at least two different prices occur a.s. during a selling season). If this is the case, then
which implies the endogenous-learning property.
Another example is E[D(p, s)] = h(β 0 + β 1 p + β 2 s). Here the demand explicitly depends on the stage s of the selling season, which models changing demand during a selling season. Again, similarly as in Section 2.3 one can define the optimal full-information solution π * β (c, s) of the pricing problem, with h(β 0 + β 1 p) in all relevant equations replaced by h(β 0 + β 1 p + β 2 s). The design matrix (6) is equal to
To prove an endogenous-learning property similar to Theorem 1, one should show that, for β close to β (0) , using the policy π * β in selling season k implies that λ min (P kS ) − λ min (P (k−1)S > ϵ, for all k ∈ N and some ϵ > 0 independent of β. This again implies strong consistency of the maximum likelihood estimate of β.
In this demand model, a sufficient condition for the endogenous-learning property to hold is if there are prices p 1 , p 2 , p 3 used in stage s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , respectively, such that (p 3 (s 2 − s 1 ) + p 2 (s 3 − den Boer and Zwart: Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Finite Inventories 18 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2011-11-587 s 1 ) + p 1 (s 3 − s 2 )) 2 > 0. (This condition ensures that the vectors {(1, p i , s i ) T | i = 1, 2, 3} are linearly independent). If this holds, then
We believe that for these alternative demand models an endogenous-learning property can be shown. Formally proving the needed price-dispersion conditions can however be somewhat tedious;
the proof of Theorem 1 for the simpler demand model E[D(p)] = h(β 0 + β 1 p) is already quite delicate. Numerical simulations show that many different prices are occur during a selling season, and not only two different prices as guaranteed by Theorem 1. This suggest that the endogenouslearning property may also holds in the two demand models discussed above. Formalizing this property for these (and other) demand models is an interesting direction for future research.
Endogenous Learning in other Decision Problems
The endogenous-learning property shown in Theorem 1 is the key result that leads to consistency of the myopic policy and to a regret that grows only O(log 2 (T )). This property seems not unique for the pricing problem under consideration, but may be satisfied by many other decision problems as well. We here briefly outline some types of problems for which this may be the case.
Consider a collection of discrete-time Markov decision problems (MDPs)
{(X, A, p(·, ·, ·, θ), r(·, ·, θ)) | θ ∈ Θ}, parameterized by a finite-dimensional parameter θ contained in some set Θ ⊂ R d . For each θ ∈ Θ, (X , A, p(·, ·, ·, θ), r(·, ·, θ)) corresponds to an MDP with statespace X , action space A, transition probabilities of going from state x to x ′ when action a is used denoted by p( x, x ′ , a, θ) , and the expected reward of using action a in state x denoted by r (x, a, θ) , for x, x ′ ∈ X and a ∈ A. (see Puterman (1994) for an introduction to MDPs). The goal of the decision maker may be to optimize the average reward or discounted reward, over a finite or infinite time horizon, without knowing the value of θ.
Suppose that each time that an action a is selected in state x, a realization y i of a random variable Y is observed, the distribution of which depends on x, a, and θ. With an appropriate statistical model of Y , the value of the unknown θ may at each decision moment be inferred from the previously observed realizations, chosen actions, and visited stated, using an appropriate den Boer and Zwart: Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Finite Inventories Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2011-11-587 19 statistical technique (maximum likelihood estimation, (non)-linear regression, Bayesian methods, nonparametric methods). Ifθ denotes the estimated value of θ, then a myopic policy is to always select the action that is optimal ifθ equals the true but unknown θ.
Strong consistency of an estimator (a.s. convergence ofθ to θ as the number of observations increase) typically presumes a minimum amount of variation/dispersion in the controls; see e.g.
Skouras (2000), Pronzato (2009) for nonlinear regression models, Chen et al. (1999) for generalized linear models, the classic Lai and Wei (1982) for linear regression models, and Hu (1996 Hu ( , 1998 for
Bayesian regression models. The decision problems described above satisfy an endogenous-learning property if the myopic policy induces an amount of dispersion in the controls that guarantees strong consistency of the estimator. As a result, no active experimentation is then necessary to eventually learn the unknown θ; learning 'takes care of itself' by just simply using myopic actions.
This contrasts many other decision problems under uncertainty where deviating from the myopic policy is necessary to eventually learn the unknown parameters of the system (e.g. in multi-armed bandit problems).
Gap Between Lower and Upper Bound on the Regret
Theorem 2 shows that the regret of our pricing strategy Φ(ϵ) is O(log 2 (T )), and Theorem 3 shows that the regret of any pricing strategy grows at least as log(T ). This "gap" between log 2 (T ) and log(T ) points to the question whether Theorem 2 can be strengthened to O(log T ).
This question turns out to be rather difficult to answer. The "additional" log(T ) term is caused by the log(t) term in the convergence rates E (1982) to convergence rates in expectation. Nassiri-Toussi and Ren (1994) show that in some cases the log(t) term is really present in the behavior of least-squares estimates, and thus cannot simply be removed. On the other hand, if the design is non-random and the disturbance terms are normally distributed, it can be shown that this log(t)-term in Proposition 2 of den Boer and Zwart (2011) can be removed. It is not at all clear how to determine, for a particular adaptive design, whether the log-term plays a role in the asymptotic behavior of linear regression estimates. Consequently, it is very hard to determine whether the log-term in Theorem 2 is present in practice, or is merely a result of the used proof techniques. For practical applications this issue is fortunately not very important, as it is quite hard to determine from data if a functions grows like log(T ) or like log 2 (T ).
For a discussion on this topic in a related pricing-and-learning problem, we refer to Section 5.2 of den Boer (2011) . 
Effect of C and S on Price Dispersion
The results from section 4, in particular from Section 4.2, indicate that the ratio between C and S influences the convergence speed of parameter estimates. Intuitively, the following happens: if C/S is close to zero, then the seller is relatively often out-of-stock; as a result less historical data is available to form estimates, which in general leads to larger estimation errors. If C/S is close to (but strictly smaller than) one, then the myopic policy induces less price dispersion; as long as the state (c, s) of the underlying MDP has c/(S − s) "close to" one (we do not further quantify this statement here), the prices stay close to the price that is optimal for C = S, and do not generate much price dispersion.
To gain some insight on the influence of C and S on the growth rate of λ min (P t ), we provide two numerical illustrations.
In the first, we take p l = 1, p h = 100, β
. We fix C = 10 and choose S ∈ {10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500}. For a fair comparison, we let the number of selling seasons n be equal to 1000/S; the total time horizon then consists of 1000 time periods, for each experiment.
For each choice of S, we perform 100 simulations and record the price dispersion measured by λ min (P t ), for t = 1, . . . , 1000. Estimation error β t − β (0) , for different values of S and n Figure 3 shows the simulation average of λ min (P t ) for t = 1, . . . , 1000, for the different values of (S, n). For all experiments, λ min (P t ) grows linearly in t. The magnitude of the growth rate (i.e. the slope of each graph in the figure) depends on the particular choice of S and n.
This magnitude effects the speed at which parameter estimates converge to the true value. Figure   4 shows for S ∈ {10, 20, 50, 1000} the simulation average of the estimation error β t − β (0) , wherê β t is based on the available prices and demand realizations induced by the optimal policy. The figure shows that the estimation error β t − β (0) converges quicker to zero if the price dispersion λ min (P t ) grows at a faster rate. For the case S = 10 the parameter estimates do not converge to the true value, and λ min (P t ) does not grow to infinity. This is the case with C = S, which means that active price experimentation is necessary (see our comments following Theorem 1). Table 3 lists the values of λ min (P t ) at t = 1000, the end of the time horizon. It shows that the amount of price dispersion is not monotone in S: the largest growth rate is achieved at the experiment with S = 50, n = 20; for S larger than 50 it is decreasing in S, and for S smaller than 50 it is increasing in S. This is in accordance with the intuition outlined above, which says that the price dispersion grows slowly if C/S is close to zero or close to one.
In our second numerical illustration, we look at a scaling of C and S. We take the same instance as above (i.e. p l = 1, p h = 100, β (0) 0 = 2, β (0) 1 = −0.4, h(z) = logit(z)), and consider 100 experiments: the n-th experiment has S = 10n and C = 3n, for n = 1, 2, . . . , 100. For n → ∞, this is the asymptotic regime considered in Wang et al. (2011) . Note that C/S = 0.3 for den Boer and Zwart: Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Finite Inventories 22 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2011-11-587 Figure 5 shows the simulation average of λ min (P S ) as function of n (on the left), and as function of log(n) (on the right). It suggests that the amount of price dispersion, induced by the optimal pricing policy in a single selling season, grows as log(n). This slow growth rate explains why, in the asymptotic regime considered by Wang et al. (2011) , active price experimentation is necessary, whereas in our setting a myopic policy works well.
EC.1. Proofs of Main Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1
Consider the k-th selling season, and write c(1) = c 1+(k−1)S , c(2) = c 2+(k−1)S , . . ., c(S) = c kS . We
show that there is a v 0 > 0 such that if prices π * β (0) (c(s), s) are used in state (c(s), s), for all s = 1, . . . , S, then there are 1 ≤ s, Figure EC. 1. We show that the sets ▹ and (L▹) satisfy the following properties:
for 1 < c < C, where f and p * are as in Lemma EC.2, and we shorthand write f * a,β (0) = f a,β (0) (p * a,β (0) ). Property (P.2) implies that a price change occurs when the path (c(s), s) 1≤s≤S hits ▹. Property (P.1) is used in the proof of property (P.2).
Proof of (P.1): Backward induction on s. If s = S and (c, s) ∈ ▹, then the assertions follow 1, S) , by (3) and the induction hypothesis. This proves (P.1).
Proof of (P.2). Induction on c. If c = 1 and (c, s) ∈ (L▹), then (c, s) = (1, S − 1). Since ∆V β (0) (1, S) = V β (0) (1, S) = f * 0,β (0) > 0, Lemma EC.2 and equation (3) imply π * β (0) (1, S − 1) ̸ = π * β (0) (1, S). In addition,
) .
(EC.4) Property (P.1) implies V β (0) (2, S) = V β (0) (1, S) and ∆V β (0) (2, S) = 0. Furthermore, ∆V β (0) (1, S) = V β (0) (1, S) > 0, and thus by Lemma EC.2,
is strictly decreasing in a. Let c > 1 and (c, s) ∈ (L▹). Then (c, s) = (c, S − c). By the induction hypothesis we have ∆V β (0) (c, S − c + 1) > 0, and thus 
In addition, c < C implies (c + 1, S − c) ∈ ▹, and thus ∆V β (0) (c + 1, S − c + 1) = 0 by (P.1). It follows
where the strict positiveness follows by the induction hypothesis from the fact that ∆V β (0) (c, S − c + 1) > 0, together with the fact that f * a,β (0) is strictly decreasing in a (Lemma EC.2(ii)). This proves (P.2), and shows that a price-change occurs when ▹ is entered.
This concludes case 1.
Case 2. The path (c(s), s) 1≤s≤S does not hit ▹. Then there is an s such that c(s) = 2 and c(s + 1) = 1. We show π * β (0) (2, s) ̸ = π * β (0) (1, s + 1), for all 1 ≤ s ≤ S − 2.
By Lemma EC.2, and the fact that π * β (0) (2, s) and π * β (0) (1, s + 1) are both contained in (p l , p h ), it suffices to show ∆V β (0) (2, s + 1) ̸ = ∆V β (0) (1, s + 2). We show by backward induction that
, and that in case 2 a price change occurs. 1, s) . 1, s + 2) ≤ 0, which for s = S − 1 follows from (P.1), and for s < S − 1 follows from the induction hypothesis.
i.e. equation (EC.9). This concludes case 2.
We have shown that, on any path (c(s), s) 1≤s≤S in X starting at (C, 1), the policy π * β (0) induces a price-change. It follows that there exists a v 0 > 0 such that for all paths (c(s), s) 1≤s≤S , 
In particular, choosing p = p * a ′ ,β , (EC.14) and thus, by combining (EC.13) and (EC.14) and using g a,β (p * a,β ) = g a ′ ,β (p * a ′ ,β ) = 1, we obtain
.
(EC.15) Thus, writing
Write x 1,β = f * 0,β and define recursively
for all (c, s) ∈ (L▹), and equation (EC.9) implies
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Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the k-th selling season, for some arbitrary fixed k ∈ N. The prices generated by Φ(ϵ) are based on the estimatesβ t , which are determined by the historical prices and demand realizations. Now, different demand realizations can lead to the same state (c, s) of the MDP. For example, a sale in the first period of a selling season and no sale in the second period leads to state (C − 2, 3), but this state is also reached if there is no sale in the first period and a sale in the second period of the selling season. These two "routes" may lead to different estimatesβ t , and to different pricing decisions in state (C − 2, 3). Thus, with Φ(ϵ), the prices in the k-th selling season are not determined by a stationary policy for the Markov decision problem described in Section 2.3.
To be able to compare the optimal revenue in a selling season with that obtained by Φ(ϵ), we define a new Markov decision problem, in which the states are sequences of demand realizations in the selling season. Conditionally on all prices and demand realizations from before the start of the selling season, Φ(ϵ) is then a stationary deterministic policy for this new MDP: each state is associated with a unique price prescribed by Φ(ϵ). This enables us to calculate bounds on the regret obtained in a single selling season.
We define this new MDP for any β ∈ B. The state spaceX consists of all sequences of possible demand realizations in the selling season:
where we denote the empty sequence by (∅). The action space is [p l , p h ]. Using action p in state (x 1 , . . . , x s ), for 0 ≤ s < S, induces a state transition from (x 1 , . . . x s ) to (x 1 , . . . , x s , 1) with probability h(β 0 + β 1 p) (corresponding to a sale, and inducing immediate reward ph(β 0 + β 1 p)1 ∑ s i=1 x i <C ), and from (x 1 , . . . x s ) to (x 1 , . . . , x s , 0) with probability 1 − h(β 0 + β 1 p) (corresponding to no sale, and inducing zero reward). There are no state transitions in the terminal states (x 1 , . . . , x S ) ∈X .
It is easily seen that the MDP described in section 2.3 is the same as the one described here, except that there states are aggregated: all states (x 1 , . . . , x s ) and (
x ′ i are there taken together. Letπ = (π(x)) x∈X be a stationary deterministic policy for this MDP with augmented state space, and letṼπ β (x) be the corresponding value function, for β ∈ B. For x = (x 1 , . . . , x s ) ∈X with s < S we write (x; 1) = (x 1 , . . . , x s , 1) and (x; 0) = (x 1 , . . . , x s , 0). Then, for any x = (x 1 , . . . , x s ) ∈X and β ∈ B,Ṽπ β (x) satisfies the backward recursioñ
where we writeṼπ β (x; 1) =Ṽπ β (x; 0) = 0 for all terminal states (x 1 , . . . , x S ) ∈X . Letπ * β be the optimal policy corresponding to β ∈ B, and writeṼ β (x) =Ṽπ * β β (x). Theñ
Using the same line of reasoning as Lemma EC.2 and EC.3, it can easily be shown that π * β ((x 1 , . . . , x s ) ) is unique if and only if
is uniquely defined for all x ∈X . Let U and v 0 be as in Theorem 1, ρ 1 as in Proposition 1, and choose ρ ∈ (0, ρ 1 ) such that β ∈ U whenever ||β − β (0) || ≤ ρ.
If (k − 1)S > T ρ , thenβ t ∈ U for all t = 1 + (k − 1)S, . . . , S(k − 1)S, and Theorem 1 implies
In addition, v 0 /2 > ϵ implies that I) of the pricing strategy Φ(ϵ) does not occur for all t with This enables us to bound the regret in the k-th selling season: 
The proof of these three sensitivity properties is given below.
Application of (S.1), (S.2), and Proposition 1 now gives 
for some K 4 independent of k and S.
We then have
for some K 5 > 0, independent of k and S.
The proof of the theorem is complete by observing
Proof of (S.0)
We prove the assertion for all (x 1 , . . . , x s−1 ) ∈X , s = 1, . . . , S, by backward induction on s. If 
Proof of (S.1)
and thus
a.s. Here the first inequality follows from Lemma EC.2(iii), observing that (S.0) implies V β (0) (Y s ; 0) −Ṽ β (0) (Y s ; 1) ∈ U a . The induction hypothesis now implies This proves (S.2).
Proof of Theorem 3
Let ψ be a pricing strategy, and define B ′ = [5/8, 6/8] × {−10/16}. For β ∈ B ′ , let ψ β be the pricing strategy that coincides with ψ if t mod S = 1, and that equals the optimal price π * β (c t , s t ) if t ec12 e-companion to den Boer and Zwart: Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Finite Inventories mod S ̸ = 1; we thus replace the pricing decisions in the second time periods of each selling season by the optimal price w.r.t. β. For T = 1 the statement of the theorem is trivial; let T ≥ 2.
By the principle of optimality we have
(1, 1) − ∆V β (1, 2)](β 0 + β 1 π * β (1, 1)) −[p 1+2(i−1) − ∆V β (1, 2)](β 0 + β 1 p 1+2(i−1) ) ]
, (EC.30) since the regret of ψ β is determined by the pricing decisions in the first periods of selling seasons, p 1+2(i−1) , i = 1, . . . , T .
For all β ∈ B ′ , we have ∆V β (1, 2) = V β (1, 2) = max
and [π * β (1, 1) − ∆V β (1, 2)](β 0 + β 1 π * β (1, 1)) − [p 1+2(i−1) − ∆V β (1, 2)](β 0 + β 1 p 1+2(i−1) ) = − β 1 (p 1+2(i−1) − π * β (1, 1)) 2 , and thus sup β∈B Regret(ψ, T ) ≥ sup β∈B ′ 10 16
E[(p 1+2(i−1) − π * β (1, 1)) 2 ].
We proceed by showing that E[(p 1+2(i−1) − π * β (1, 1)) 2 ] ≥ 1 ai+b , for some a, b > 0 and all 2 ≤ i ≤ T . This inequality follows from a generalization of the van Trees inequality, derived in Gill and Levit (1995, equation (4)). Similar approaches to derive regret lower bounds are found in Goldenshluger and Zeevi (2009), Harrison et al. (2011), and Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) . Our proof closely follows the proof of Lemma 4.6 in the e-companion to Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) .
Fix 2 ≤ i ≤ T . define the sample space D (i−1)S = {0, 1} (i−1)S , let D (i−1)S = (d 1 , . . . , d (i−1)S ) ∈ D (i−1)S be the random variable denoting the demand in periods 1 to (i − 1)S, and write d (i−1)S for a realization of D (i−1)S . Define the family of distributions
is the distribution of demand realizations in time periods 1 to (i − 1)S.
Let λ 0 (θ) = cos 2 (πθ/2)1 |θ|≤1 , define the density λ on [5/8, 6/8] as λ(β 0 ) = 1 1/8 λ 0 ( β 0 − 11/16 (1/8)
)
, β 0 ∈ [5/8, 6/8], e-companion to den Boer and Zwart: Dynamic Pricing and Learning with Finite Inventories ec13 cf. Goldenshluger and Zeevi (2009, page 1632) , and let Z be a random variable supported on [5/8, 6/8] with density λ.
Then by the van Trees inequality, we have
where the expectations are with respect to the joint distribution of Q β 0 and λ.
Now
E
[ ( ∂ ∂β 0 log Q β 0 (D (i−1)S )) 2 | D (i−1)S−1 = d (i−1)S−1 ] (EC.31) = 2 (β 0 + β 1 p 2(i−1) )(1 − (β 0 + β 1 p 2(i−1) )) (EC. 
EC.2. Auxiliary Lemmas
In this section we formulate and prove several auxiliary results that are used in the proofs of the main theorems of the paper.
Lemma EC.1 shows that the assumptions we impose on g a,β (p) do not only hold for a ∈ [0, r * ] and β = β (0) , but also on an open neighborhood around [0, r * ] × {β (0) }. This result enables us in later proofs to apply the implicit function theorem. Lemma EC.2 considers the optimization problem underlying (3), and shows uniqueness, differentiability, and sensitivity properties. These results are applied in Lemma EC.3 to conclude that (π * β ) 1≤c≤C,1≤s≤S is uniquely defined and continuous in β, on an open neighborhood around β (0) . Lemma EC.4 relates price differences to the growth of λ min (P t ) during a selling season.
